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 Risk assessments in the sports security domain are generally accepted as objective 
reports with a small margin of subjective information included.  The researcher 
interviewed 10 risk professionals in the sports security industry to evaluate and compare 
the handling of objective information such as statistical data and historical reports to 
expert judgment.  Interviews were examined using a grounded theory methodology with 
the Atlas T.I. software program to create overarching themes and a theory of the roles of 
objective and subjective information within security discourse.  Findings pointed to a 
heavy reliance on expert opinion in comparison to data reports.  A moderate amount of 
subjectivity is beneficial for decision-making because the evaluator can draw conclusions 
that either support or reject previous notions based on their own judgements (Park, 
Peacey, Munafo, 2014).  Using an acceptable amount of subjectivity allows the evaluator 
to consider the information provided by other evaluators and weigh the quality of that 
information to formulate their own conclusions based on both the knowledge provided 
and their own ideas (Park, Peacey, Munafo, 2014).  The risk assessment process takes 
into account a larger degree of subjectivity than what is deemed ideal by Park, Peacey, 
and Munafo (2014).  By doing so, sports evaluators are more likely to generate false 
hypotheses and misappropriate risks and mitigation tactics. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 The attacks that occurred September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon showed the nation just how vulnerable organizations and their respective 
venues are to damage and destruction. As a response to 9/11, the security industry began 
strengthening and expanding the measures taken to provide protection and safety to 
individuals, changing the security atmosphere in the United States forever (Hall et al., 
2012).  In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security released a report that identified 
sport stadiums as soft targets for terrorist activity (Miller, Veltri, & Gillentine, 2008).  As 
a response to the 9/11 attacks and the DHS report, sporting and special event 
organizations acknowledged and took steps to develop improved risk identification and 
response measures.  Although the United States’ sporting and special event venues began 
striving to advance security protocols shortly after 9/11, threats to large structures such as 
sporting arenas were prevalent before then both nationally and internationally.  In regard 
to crowd management alone, there have been several reports of serious injury made 
within the past fifty years.  Incidents include the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster in which 
96 spectators were killed after a surge of soccer fans rushed through an open emergency 
exit during the FA Cup semi-final game on April 15, 1989 and the Rhode Island Fire in 
West Warwick, Rhode Island where a fire broke out during a Great White concert 
resulting in the death of 100 people and injured over 250 in under five minutes (NCS4, 
2018).  Post 9/11, events such as the 2002 FBI alert where Al-Qaeda’s Manual of Afghan 
Jihad pointed to U.S. college football stadiums as a prospective target for terrorism. The 
2005 University of Oklahoma suicide bomber who prematurely detonated a bomb outside 




terrorism remain persistent concerns of sporting and special event locations (Hall et al., 
2012).  The higher the participation at such events, the higher the risk involved; therefore, 
it is imperative to develop sound policies and procedures to ensure the safety of 
participants.  To do so, organizations utilize risk assessment and management strategies.  
These methods are meant to identify, analyze, and evaluate risks unique to the event and 
venue. 
 It is evident that society as a whole has become increasingly interested in risk and 
protection measures over the course of the past few decades.  This awareness and hyper-
vigilance supports Ulrich Beck’s (1992) theory about living in a risk society.  The risk 
society thesis holds that the development of new technologies and industrialization has 
manifested an increase in risk which effects the economy, security, environment, and 
politics (Mythen & Walklate, 2005). As a result, society has grown more and more 
conscious of danger and developed a relatively strong sense of fear.  This mindfulness, in 
turn, sparks a need for risk management as a means to avoid experiencing loss (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997).  Sporting and special event organization operators attempt to achieve 
this through a form of risk discourse by defining the vulnerabilities existing at their 
venues and developing methods to deal with those identified (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  
There are three main types of risks that sporting and special event operators investigate: 
mission, asset, and security risks.  Mission risks include anything that hinder the 
organization from achieving its goals and objectives.  Asset risks encompasses anything 
that poses a threat to physical property, and security risks relate to everything that can 




When discussing the process in which professionals in the field assess threats, the 
term “risk” and its meaning are extremely important.  A risk is defined by the 
International Organization for Standardization (2009) as an effect of uncertainty on an 
organization’s goals or objectives.  Based on this definition, an expressed risk is 
dependent on the objectives set forth by a venue.  As a result, characterizations of risk 
vary slightly between organizations.  This disparity is partly due to the difference 
between contexts for individual organizations (ISO, 2009).  One must first understand the 
context in which risk is defined for a particular venue before an assessment is conducted.  
By establishing the context, the intentions of the organization, environment, stakeholders, 
and diversity of risk criteria are identified by the evaluators (ISO, 2009).  To classify 
these factors, both the external and internal context must be reviewed.  In addition to 
considering other contextual factors, the perceptions, values, and relationships with 
stakeholders are examined on the internal and external levels (ISO, 2009).  Internal and 
external stakeholders’ perceptions of risk and specific values can shift the venue’s 
objectives based on how much influence they may have at that particular location.   
 To identify potential threats and minimize the probability of negative occurrences, 
organizations take part in risk management processes.  Risk management and managing 
risk are two relatively separate entities that complement one another to satisfy the 
objectives of the organization (ISO, 2009).  The risk management framework only works 
if the organization enforces the framework in its entirety and all related principles.  
According to the International Organization for Standardization (2009) guidelines, the 
risk management process should hold a key role in all organizational processes and 




makers become more informed about the nature of risk in relation to their organization or 
venue based on the results reported during the risk management process.  These results 
allow decision-makers to make educated judgments as well as prioritize and determine 
actions, inactions, and possible alternatives (ISO, 2009). 
 One of the main aspects within the risk management process is the risk 
assessment.  Risk assessments are aimed at determining the level of risk within a venue 
and providing a report that will aid decision-makers’ conclusion to take an action in an 
effort to mitigate risks.  These reports examine the venue’s current security model and 
focus its attention on areas of vulnerability that may need to be strengthened in the near 
future (Hall et al., 2012).  Organizations use risk assessment reports as a means for 
justifying the implementation of particular countermeasures and increasing security 
awareness (Hall et al., 2012).  Assessments use a combination of both information and 
knowledge to reach a conclusion (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  While information 
includes documents such as news articles, statistics, and legislation, knowledge 
encompasses interpretations of context, conceptualization, and relatedness (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997).  Some risk assessments today are conducted with a mixed method 
approach, using both expert opinion and scientific or logical data such as statistics and 
past reporting while other risk assessments utilize one or the other.  
In order for the risk process and security to be effective, society must be able to 
trust the organization and the manner in which the organization strives to assess and 
mitigate risk.  Security in this sense refers to the method in which organizations choose to 
manage risk and enforce safety policies (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  Successful 




organization (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  While risks are subject to change based on 
social, cultural, and political factors, trust is built on a foundation of faith and 
intangibility where society may not directly observe the assessment and mitigation of 
risks but trusts that risk professionals are tending to them as best as possible (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997).  Organizations strive for a strong balance between trust and acceptable 
risk through risk management and assessment frameworks to lessen the probability of 
negative events that may occur.  Security operators implement mitigation tactics such as 
barriers, camera systems, and metal detectors as a means to minimize the likelihood of 
threats occurring at their facilities.  As the probability of negative events decreases, the 
probability of positive events should increase.  As a result, society’s trust in the 
organization to maintain a respectable level of security would inevitably increase.  Risks 
and their interpretations are essentially subject to adaptation based on the political or 
cultural climate (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  Perception of risk changes from person to 
person; therefore, decisions made during the risk process may be partially based on an 
individual’s perception of risk or some level of bias.  What one organization may define 
as a moderate risk, another organization may define as a high risk.  One person’s 
perception of risk can influence other evaluators to adopt similar viewpoints about the 
same topic which can lead to possible false hypotheses and misevaluations of risk based 
on an organization’s subjective definition of risk. (Park, Peacey, Munafò, 2014). 
Data collection for risk assessments include, but are not limited to, security audits, 
site visits, and interviews with personnel.  Data obtained is expected to characterize the 
facility by describing the physical aspects of the venue, identify unfavorable events, and 




such as reports, statistical data, news, legislation, and facts, knowledge refers to the 
interpretation of information by observing the context, relevance, and conceptualization 
of collected data (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  Information contains objective data that 
are based on the factual existence of incidences.  Knowledge is largely subjective because 
it’s central focus is on the understandings and experiences of the evaluator. 
While risk assessments utilize either expert opinion, formulated data, or a mixture 
of both, there is one question that remains in regard to this process.  How do individual 
perceptions of risk shape the assessment and management process?  In this study, risk 
processes and data sources of large sports security arenas were examined to determine the 
degree of objectivity versus subjectivity inherent in their risk management processes. To 
do so, interviews with risk and security professionals were collected and analyzed to 
better understand the relationship between the two in the risk process. Additionally, 
findings were applied to the risk society thesis proposed by Ulrich Beck (1992) and 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
This thesis examines the relationship between subjective and objective 
information and their implications within the risk decision-making process for large 
sporting venues. This chapter will first explore society’s awareness of unplanned events 
and risks of modern life within the risk society.  The risk management and assessment 
processes acknowledge these effects and are designed to mitigate identified risks.  This 
chapter will also discuss the importance of the risk process within sporting venues. 
Lastly, perceptions of risk will be considered to frame the research question.  Perceptions 
of risk alter the definition of risk, which inevitably influences the overall success of the 
management and assessment process.  
Risk Society 
People encounter, assess, and mitigate risks at varying levels every day. Areas 
with moderately large mobile populations are subject to many potential risks. Practically 
anywhere individuals choose to congregate, such as schools, shopping malls, airports, or 
sporting arenas, are susceptible to at least a moderate level of risk (Hall et al., 2012). The 
ISO (2009) defines risk as an "effect of uncertainty on objectives" that expresses both the 
consequences and likelihood of occurrence for a particular event (p. 1). As society 
industrializes and strives to make life safer for everyone, the general public has become 
more concerned with risk. Society sees itself as more exposed to risk than people in the 
past and believes it is continually getting worse (Slovic, 1999). How society perceives 
risks and hazards is continuously changing (Slovic, 1999). These changes, in turn, make 




In the sporting and entertainment domains specifically, security personnel must utilize a 
risk assessment process to take into account potential risks and the effects risks will have 
on the general public and society as a whole.  The proper assessment and management of 
such risks are meant to minimize the potential for detrimental consequences such as mass 
casualty or an economic downturn (Hall et al., 2012). 
The collective fear experienced by a society, in addition to a premonition of 
danger, shapes society’s values and its perception of risk (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). 
Risk society is rooted in the notion that society not only cares deeply about future 
occurrences but also focuses on being cognizant of the risks linked to the different 
surroundings in which they may interact. Society embraces negative logic by fixating on 
fear and prevention of the worst outcomes possible rather than emphasizing progress 
(Beck, 1992 & Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Through statistics, research, and media 
outlets, people have begun to understand that there is a certain amount of risk associated 
with each action taken. The shared fear among members of society increases the need for 
the latest information regarding risk, and the acquisition of risk information, in turn, 
becomes a manufacturer of risk perception within society at large (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997). 
When a society accepts the knowledge of experts in risk professions, society loses 
its "cognitive sovereignty" (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Any occupation that claims to 
possess a level of abstract knowledge regarding addressing risk concerns and providing 
expert risk management services is defined as a risk professional (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997). The role of these occupations is to identify, rationalize through assessment and 




security (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Risk professionals utilize both risk management 
and risk assessment to satisfy their role. While risk management focuses on the 
enforcement of risk decisions and management policies, risk assessment determines and 
evaluates risks as they relate to an organization's risk criteria. 
 Society’s demand for risk knowledge, in addition to the subsequent creation of 
risk due to that knowledge, indicates a need for effective risk communication through the 
use of security.  Security refers to circumstances where mollification of a particular risk 
or hazard occurs (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). Because security is supported by 
institutions and organizations, society assumes that these securities can be trusted to 
protect individuals from loss or harm (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  In regard to an 
organization or institution’s risk distribution, individuals decide tolerability of risks 
within the system as a method of control (Beck, 1992). Tolerable values of risk are seen 
as harmless, but they are also "blank checks" that can potentially damage a system over 
some time while they remain under the accepted level (Beck, 1992).  For example, the 
amount of pollution in the environment may be determined to be at an acceptable level, 
but pollution of the environment is still occurring despite the evaluators’ decision to not 
mitigate it.  Continuation of pollution over time can eventually become a primary concern 
to the evaluators because the accumulation of pollution now poses a threat to the integrity 
of the area in question (Beck, 1992). Handling risks induces a generalized perception 
between theory and practice, across margins of specialties and disciplines, political, 
public, science, and economic communities, and between value and fact (Beck, 1992). 
 Society’s awareness of risk and its associated consequences reinforces the 




and mitigation conducted by risk professionals and security.  In order for risk 
professionals to assess risk and manage identified threats, they must apply risk 
management principles to their process. 
Risk Management 
The ISO provides a guide for organizations to manage and assess risk in general 
terms in their Internal Standards for Risk Management (ISO, 2009).  Organizations use 
the principles and frameworks provided within the document to shape their own risk 
management and assessment methodologies.  While different organizations will have 
varying and unique methods for identifying and mitigating risks depending on individual 
goals and objectives, every establishment is expected to follow the ISO guidelines and 
implement them in their approaches (ISO, 2009). 
To manage risk, organizations must identify and analyze risk. Afterward, 
evaluators determine if the risk should be manipulated through risk treatments to satisfy 
the organization's risk criteria (ISO, 2009). Risk management differs distinctly from 
managing risk; while "risk management" refers to the principles, frameworks, and 
processes that are utilized, "managing risk" refers to the enforcement of those principles, 
frameworks, and processes to specific risks (ISO, 2009). For risk management to be 
effective, the organization must comply with all three sections of the process (ISO, 2009).   
Figure 1 illustrates the risk management principles, framework, and process in its 
entirety as ISO recommends it to be conducted (ISO, 2009). The principles section begins 
the risk management process by setting a list of standards for the process to follow as 
shown in Figure 1. The analyzed information has to be the best available to the 




nature. Risk management influences the responsibilities of management and strategic 
planning, rather than being separate from other organizational processes (ISO, 2009). The 
process creates better-informed decision-makers, so they can prioritize and evaluate 
appropriate courses of action (ISO, 2009). Ideally, the overall process should contribute 
to the objectives of the organization and improvement of performance by keeping both 
human and cultural factors in mind. Additionally, the context should be inclusive in that 
it acknowledges external and internal capabilities, perceptions, and intentions. The 
possibility that circumstances will change, new risks will emerge or disappear, or 
knowledge will evolve is always present; therefore, the risk management process should 
be adaptable and responsive to change. Organizations must continually improve their risk 
management process to better tailor it to their organization and stay up to date with new 





Figure 1. Risk management principles, framework, and process (ISO, 2009) 
 The risk management framework provides the foundations and arrangements in 
which risk management will be inserted into the organization (ISO, 2009). The five main 
parts of the framework begin with mandate and commitment. The remaining four pieces 
connect in a continuing cycle and include the design of the frame for managing risk, 
implementing risk management, monitoring and review of the framework, and continual 
improvement of the framework. At the mandate and commitment level, the organization's 
management ensures that the organization complies to the risk management policies 
established by communicating the benefits to stakeholders, aligning the objectives of the 
organization with the system, and keeping every level of the organization accountable 




for the managing risk step in the overall framework; these two steps resemble one another 
to some degree because they evaluate some of the same factors to command their 
particular roles within the frame such as commitment, accountability, and context.  
When designing a framework for a specific organization, additional factors such 
as allocating the proper resources and instituting communication and reporting 
mechanisms must be considered (ISO, 2009). After the design, implementation occurs. 
At this point, the organization consults with stakeholders and holds training sessions for 
members of the organization to keep everyone informed. Additionally, the risk policy is 
applied to organizational processes at all relevant levels of the organization (ISO, 2009). 
Following the implementation of risk management, the framework is monitored and 
reviewed by measuring performance, effectiveness, and deviation from the risk 
management plan (ISO, 2009). Once the framework is evaluated, it should be continually 
improved to guarantee that the organization is equipped to manage risk as effectively as 
possible (ISO, 2009). 
  The risk management process has two steps that occur at all stages of the process: 
the communication and consultation stage and the monitoring and review stage. 
Communication with internal and external stakeholders occurs during every step of the 
process. This constant communication ensures that the professionals responsible for 
implementing the risk management process and the stakeholders all understand the 
reasoning behind decisions made (ISO, 2009). Continual monitoring and review 
throughout the risk management process allow for the gathering of supplementary 




The first step in the risk management process, separate from communication and 
monitoring, defines the internal and external contexts. The external context refers to 
influences from the external environment and can be social, political, cultural, economic, 
natural, financial, or legal in nature. Even external stakeholders can impact context 
through relationships with the organization or their values and perceptions (ISO, 2009.) 
Internal context refers to influences from the internal environment and focuses on 
understanding the goals and objectives of the organization. To do so, the culture of the 
organization, standards and guidelines, relationships with internal stakeholders, and 
contractual relationships are evaluated (ISO, 2009). Positive stakeholders are involved in 
the identification and treatment of risk, offering help throughout the entire process, while 
negative stakeholders resist the process (NCS4, 2018). Establishing the context as it 
relates to stakeholders helps those involved to better understand the situation before 
beginning the process. As the context is defined, evaluators can determine the proper risk 
criteria appropriate for the organization. The risk criteria reflect the organization's 
objectives, available resources, and values to assess the significance of risk (ISO, 2009). 
Following the establishment of context is the risk assessment. There are three steps 
within the risk assessment: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. Once the 
risk assessment is complete, the organization chooses which risks will be treated and 
decides which treatment methods will be taken to mitigate select risks (ISO, 2009). 
Within the risk management framework, there is a step set aside for 







Risk assessments combines science and judgment and is influenced by 
psychological, cultural, political, and social considerations (Slovic, 1999). The risk 
process calls for evaluators to identify, analyze, and evaluate risks using the ISO 
standards as a guide (NCS4, 2018). A list of risks is generated that could either create, 
improve, inhibit, degrade, accelerate, or postponement the accomplishment of the 
organization's objectives (ISO, 2009). Identification includes consequences and 
significant causes (ISO, 2009). Risk analysis considers the positive and negative 
implications of the risks identified and weighs the likelihood of each result occurring 
(ISO, 2009). The report can be qualitative, semi-qualitative, quantitative, or a 
combination depending on the situation (ISO, 2009). Differing expert opinions, 
uncertainty, and the availability, quality, or quantity of information can influence the 
analysis (ISO, 2009). During the risk evaluation process, information obtained during the 
examination is compared with the risk criteria to assist decision-makers with risk 
treatment measures. Sometimes, evaluation leads to certain risks to be analyzed further 
before decisions are made (ISO, 2009). 
Organizations can utilize risk assessment tools and techniques to identify, 
analyze, and evaluate risk assuming the devices are suited to the goals and objectives of 
the organization (ISO, 2009). Tools such as the Risk Analysis and Management for 
Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) framework suggest using event tree analysis to 
determine the likelihood of attack success (Cox Jr., 2008). Event tree analysis is a 
systematic manner in which data can be arranged into branches representing cascading 




single event can affect the entire system by showing how different variables interact with 
one another within the system, and how the event can result in system failure (Ruijters & 
Stoelinga, 2015). However, studies show that a more complete risk assessment is 
generated when risk is viewed in both the linear and networked context, meaning 
evaluation of individualized risk and risk as it relates to other vulnerabilities and threats 
cascading through the system (Clark-Ginsberg, Abolhassani, & Rahmati, 2018). 
Probability methods can be used to account for uncertainties encountered during 
the assessment process. Techniques such as fuzzy logic, Bayesian methods, the 
Dempster-Shafer belief approach, human failure estimates, and analytic hierarchy 
processes have been suggested as means to address uncertainties associated with risk 
(Pasman & Rogers, 2018). Suggested methods to validate and increase the credibility of 
risk assessment results include the SAPHEDRA model protocol, Quantitative Risk 
Assessment maturity model, peer-reviewed assessments and the separation of the analysis 
and decision-making processes. The SAPHEDRA model encourages an evaluation 
protocol to be developed while the Quantitative Risk Assessment Maturity Model assists 
with issues and possible failures that should be avoided in the risk assessment (Pasman & 
Rogers, 2018). Peer reviewing the results of the risk assessment can decrease 
confirmation bias through means of having outside figures evaluate the contents of the 
analysis (Pasman & Rogers, 2018). Additionally, by separating the analysis and decision-
making process, influence by stakeholders is minimalized to a degree, and the evaluator 
can focus solely on the study of risk (Pasman & Rogers, 2018). 
The formula Risk = Likelihood x Vulnerability x Consequence (L x V x C) is also 




between zero and five. If a value is scored as a five, the evaluator is without a doubt sure 
of its likelihood, vulnerability, or consequences. The probability of an event occurring 
can be determined qualitatively or quantitatively, subjectively or objectively (NCS4, 
2018). The product of the scores cannot exceed one hundred twenty-five. Once each risk 
has a L x V x C value, the risks can be prioritized based on ratings and order of 
importance (NCS4, 2018). When prioritizing risks, Cox (2008) argues that allocating 
resources to only threats with the highest risk scores is not the best method of risk 
management because various constraints on budgeting and costs of countermeasures can 
minimize rather than optimize the management of risks an area faces.  
The practices adopted to assess risk are essential to the management of risk and 
potential consequences.  Sporting venues utilize the principles and frameworks set forth 
by ISO to mold their own methodologies for risk assessment and alleviation as a way to 
strengthen their chances of being prepared for any threat that may cause harm to their 
facilities, events, and spectators. 
Sporting Events and Risk 
Sporting events capture the attention of spectators and athletes alike from all over 
the world.  In 2012, approximately 30.3 million people reportedly attended or 
participated in sporting events in the United States throughout the year (National 
Endowment for the Arts, 2018).  As of 2015, the North American Industry Classification 
System reported 4,315 spectator sporting establishments were employing approximately 
128,000 people within the United States (Bureau of Census, 2018).  The statistics show 
high participation at both the employment and attendance level within the spectator 




with high involvement comes a high potential for risk.  In the event a terrorist attack was 
successful at any major sporting event, the sizeable amount of participation expected 
could lead to relatively high casualty and fatality rates.   
 Risk assessments consider the risks for both “events” and “incidents” by taking an 
all-hazards approach to prepare and protect organizations against potential threats related 
to a particular venue or event (Hall et al., 2012).  These hazards include but are not 
limited to terrorist activity via the use of a weapon of mass destruction or explosives, 
active shooter situation, weather threat or natural disaster, civil disturbance, cyber threat, 
and event cancellation (Hall et al., 2012).  While "events" are planned and generally have 
information readily available for evaluators to examine, "incidents" are unexpected and 
do not always provide enough information (NCS4, 2018).  For industries such as sports, 
it is important to use risk assessments for the planning and management of events as well 
as a preparatory measure for incidents (NCS4, 2018).  Sporting events and the facilities in 
which they take place contribute to the nation's critical infrastructure; therefore, the 
impact from either a human-made or natural threat would present significant 
consequences for the industry and society as a whole (Hall et al., 2012).  If a sporting 
facility fails to be adequately prepared for potential threats, mass casualties, economic or 
social damage, increases in insurance premiums, and liability issues can be expected 
(Hall et al., 2012). To evade risks as much as possible, planning and preparation using 
information reported from risk assessments before the event can effectively limit 
disturbance (NCS4, 2018).   
Sporting events generally have an increased media presence covering the event 




the general public in the aftermath (Hall et al., 2012).  The Olympics, as one of the most 
highly publicized and attended sporting events for the entire world, is susceptible to 
myriad threats including terrorism.  Both the 2004 and 2008 Olympics had domestic 
terror incidents occur before the Games, with the Kalithea district bombing in Athens and 
the attack on the paramilitary border police headquarters in the Xinjiang province, 
respectively (Jennings, 2012). During the1972 Olympics in Munich, eleven athletes and 
coaches were kidnapped and murdered by Palestinian militants.  This event is known as 
one of the most infamous terrorist attacks during an Olympics (Jennings, 2012).  Large 
scale events such as the Olympics generate a host of uncertainties and hazards for 
governing and ensuring the game runs as smoothly as possible (Jennings, 2012). 
Professional or college sports should consider similar risk factors, but the scope in which 
the risks are evaluated and managed are on a smaller scale due to the difference in venues 
and events taking place. 
How sports owners and operators assess and mitigate risk has evolved 
dramatically since the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 (Miller, Veltri, & 
Gillentine, 2008).  While the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11 were not related to the 
sports industry directly, the attacks significantly reformed the methods in which safety 
and security were approached throughout the nation by altering the current mindset 
regarding risk at the time.  In the aftermath of the attacks, security personnel at sporting 
and entertainment venues recognized the need to become more proactive in response 
rather than reactive to risks that their site was vulnerable to.  Funding opportunities for 
safety and security at major sporting events were more prevalent post-9/11. Money from 




workforces with improved intelligence and technological means (Hall et al., 2012). While 
risks are different for every facility based on the events held and the location, there is a 
need for facility operators to determine a set of security standards to abide by (Hall et al., 
2012).  Sports owners and operators began conceptualizing risk in broader terms for their 
facilities.  In the post-9/11 era, facilities are more cognizant of the potential for terrorist 
threats in addition to other risks that may occur.  
Therefore, owners and operators of sporting facilities take an all-hazard approach 
to implementing countermeasures to manage threats and vulnerabilities at individual 
venues.  Countermeasures considered by owners and operators include, but are not 
limited to, installing security cameras, conducting background checks for vendors, 
creating a credential and record keeping system, and developing emergency operations 
and evacuation plans (Hall et al., 2012).  The Department of Homeland Security Support 
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act was created as a 
response to the lawsuits that were filed shortly after the 9/11 attacks (Hall et al., 2012).  
The SAFETY Act is meant to help lessen the liability occurring as a result of terrorism 
and the standards expressed in the document can be applied to any facility on alert for an 
attack (Hall et al., 2012). In addition to the utilization of the SAFETY Act, owners and 
operators of sporting facilities have the opportunity to participate in benchmarking or 
communicating with other facilities to better compare policies and best practices to 
improve the overall security standards for the sports industry (Hall et al., 2012).   
Sports venues possess a certain degree of trust and expectation from the general 
public to provide the best safety and security practices available to event participants.  To 




manner in which risk information is interpreted by these professionals greatly influences 
the overall process and mitigation tactics. 
Risk Perception 
For the risk process to work, society must be able to trust those who are charged 
with determining risk. The individuals who control the definition of risk also control the 
venue or organization’s response to it (Slovic, 1999). This means the controller of risk is 
also in control of the objectives of the organization. Because risk is an effect of 
uncertainty on an organization's goals or objectives, an expressed risk depends on the 
targets set in place and contrasts slightly between individual organizations due to the 
difference of contexts (ISO, 2009). The organization must balance both trust and 
acceptable risk to maintain security (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). To build confidence, a 
combination of effective communication and respect for the knowledge and attributes of 
others has to be maintained (Hall et al., 2012). Without trust, risk communication efforts 
are ineffective and limited (Slovic, 1999). Experts have to slowly gain the public's trust 
and be careful not to lose it once attained. The public tends to pay closer attention to the 
contrary, trust-destroying events rather than positive, trust-building events, making it 
easy for trust to be lost and never regained (Slovic, 1999.) 
 Risk discourse forces the public to agree with expert knowledge as the practical 
response to risk and reminds society that wisdom always holds some degree of ignorance 
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Although it is not feasible to completely subtract risk from 
a given system, danger can be evaded, transferred, or minimized to some degree (NCS4, 
2018). Society relies heavily on expert judgment regardless of whether or not personal 




and risk demonstrated 59.6% of the sample population believed the expert rather than 
experiences of friends and showed no feelings of doubt (Austen, 2009). Factors that 
influenced the sample population's decision include knowledge gained from the school, 
respectability, and superiority of the teacher, and bias of the sample population (Austen, 
2009). It is only when experts begin to lack a consensus among themselves that 
inexperienced individuals start to search for their knowledge regarding risk. This is where 
a cross between expertise and experience occurs (Giddens, 1991; Austen, 2008). 
Inexperienced individuals tend to think of risk in broader terms than those deemed 
experts (Austen, 2009). While experts supply risk assessments characterized by objective, 
analytical, rational judgments of “real risk,” the public relies on subjective perceptions of 
risk that are often hypothetical, emotional, and irrational (Slovic, 1999). 
It is assumed that physical and natural processes produce the probability and 
consequences of events in a manner that can be quantified objectively through risk 
assessment. However, social science analysis rejects this claim by arguing that risk is 
fundamentally subjective (Slovic, 1999). The subjectivity of assessment cannot be stated 
clearly, and the objectivity of assessment is arbitrated through the frame of the subjective 
(Orr, 2010). Similarly, a study involving the decision-making process for peer review of 
scientific journals revealed the level of subjectivity applied could greatly change the 
outcome of the possibility of herding, misperception, and acceptance concerning 
submissions within the scientific community (Park, Peacey, Munafò, 2014). In this 
regard, a moderate degree of subjectivity is nearly ideal to combat the influence of the 
rest of the scientific community which may lead to an incorrect hypothesis (Park, Peacey, 




community sway a reviewer to a decision despite their own convictions is known as 
herding. According to Park, Peacey, and Munafò, herding is to be expected to some 
degree regardless of the level of subjectivity utilized or rationality and motivation of the 
reviewer (2014).  This is partially due to rational individuals taking into account all 
information available before making a definitive decision, including opinions from peers.  
People who take this approach understand that humans are imperfect beings that make 
mistakes, and additional opinions may reinforce or weaken their own perceptions (Park, 
Peacey, Munafò, 2014). 
This thesis examines the risk process at large sporting venues to investigate the 
association between subjectivity and objectivity within that process. It is hypothesized 
that assessments and the instruments used to generate them contain a large amount of 
subjective data, but quantification makes the assessments appear more objective than they 
are.  The risk processes and data sources of large sports security venues will be examined 
primarily through interviews to contextualize the analysis. Specifically, in-depth 
interviews with security professionals at major sports arenas were conducted to better 
understand practices utilized when assessing risk. These interviews were coded using a 
grounded theory methodology to ascertain how objective or subjective these experts 
believe their risk assessment methodologies to be. Additionally, the types of data (e.g., 
expert opinion versus counts of incidents) will be assessed through these interviews to 





Chapter 3: Methods 
 
The overarching goal for this project is to evaluate the risk assessment process in 
large sporting venues to better understand the subjective and objective elements used by 
risk professionals. It is hypothesized that these assessments and the tools used to 
construct them are primarily subjective in nature, but quantification of information gives 
the impression that final reports are more objective than they actually are. The risk 
processes and data sources of large sporting and entertainment venues were reviewed 
through interviews with experienced security professionals to investigate this 
relationship. The interviews provide a better understanding of the practices used by risk 
professionals when assessing risk for these facilities as well as information regarding the 
perception of those carrying out the evaluations regarding how they see information 
within the process. A grounded theory approach was used to code and develop the theory 
within the interviews to determine the objective and subjective elements in the 
participants' risk assessment methods. 
Grounded Theory and Procedure 
 Grounded theory methods provide guidelines for gathering and studying 
qualitative data (Charmaz, 2014). While there are different approaches to grounded 
theory, every strategy has six variables in common. These include: coding collected data, 
discovering social processing within the data, inductively developing abstract categories, 
refining categories through theoretical selection, memo writing in-between coding and 
writing, and assimilating categories into a conceptual frame (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). All six characteristics listed must be exhibited for a methodology to be 




research question. For this thesis, the use of objective and subjective information within 
the risk assessment process was the primary focus. Data was collected through interviews 
with professionals in the sports security industry to explore the interaction between the 
two.  
Sampling 
A convenience sampling technique was utilized to recruit participants for the 
study. Vice Presidents of Security for professional sporting teams as well as Police Chiefs 
for Universities were among the points of contact. A formal request for interview 
participation was sent via email to both the listed point of contact, typically the Chief 
Security Officer or Vice President of Security for the venue, and to potential participants. 
First, the point of contact was asked for permission to research with personnel who fit the 
sampling frame of experienced sports security professionals. The email provided the 
point of contact with information regarding the goals of the study as well as the 
introduction letter that was emailed to potential interviewees. Once permission was 
granted, the introduction letter was emailed to prospective participants inquiring interest 
in conducting an interview. In this email, the purpose, as well as the risks and benefits of 
the study, were noted. Interviews were conducted either in person or over the phone. 
Interview questions focused on seven primary categories of interest: qualifications and 
training, internal and external context of assessment, risk assessment tools and 
methodology, risk criteria, data analysis, mitigation tactics, and perceptions of risk. 
Participants in this study are individuals who have experience working with risk 
instruments and data sources in large sports and entertainment venues. To participate in 




organizations tasked with public protection at mass gatherings or have experience 
working with risk instruments and data sources. All participants had to sign a consent 
form allowing responses to be used for research purposes and acknowledge they were 
above the age of eighteen. The identities of the participants and venues at which they are 
employed will remain anonymous throughout the thesis to maintain confidentiality. The 
researcher has assigned pseudonyms to participants and their associated venues for the 
sake of privacy. 
 Ten interviews were completed. Out of the 10 interviews, two were from Police 
Chiefs of Universities, three were from VPs of Security for professional teams, and five 
were from security managers for large sporting arenas. The distribution of expertise 
among the sampling pool is listed the table below. 
  Interviews Conducted     
Background of Respondents Number of Participants Males Females 
University Police Chief 2 2 0 
Vice President of Security 
for Professional Team 3 3 0 
Security Managers of Large 
Sporting Arenas 5 4 1 
 
All 10 participants have experience working with sporting and special events at their 
respective venues and were familiar with the risk assessment process. Every interview 
was audio recorded and fully transcribed. Interviews with participants ranged between 30 
minutes and one hour and seven minutes. 
The objective is to construct theory through an examination of processes and 
actions expressed within the data set; however, before a theory can be generated, the data 




research memos were imported into the Atlas T.I. software program to perform 
qualitative analysis. This software helps with the organization and interpretation of data 
obtained from the interviews. Using Atlas T.I., transcriptions will be coded line by line to  
explore theoretical possibilities shared in the interviews and assist with the generation of 
conceptual categories used for developing theory later in the analysis.  
Initial coding highlights language that reflects action (Charmaz, 2014). During the 
initial coding process, it is important to remain open-minded about concepts being 
examined (Charmaz, 2014). Focused coding occurs after initial coding is complete. At 
this point, the initial codes are analyzed in large groups based on which codes occur most 
frequently to test developing theories and direct the analysis (Charmaz, 2014). 
Throughout the coding process, any relevant thoughts that come to mind about the data or 
research question are documented in the form of a memo in Microsoft Word and 
imported in Atlas T.I. to be coded as well.  
Codes and Categories 
 In total, there were 132 codes identified from open-coding the data obtained.  
From the open-coded information, eight code groups were generated.  These groups were 
decision-making, experience and expertise, information sharing, information used, 
mitigation tactics, perceptions of risk, selection of process, and training.  The primary 
codes of interest are listed below with their groundedness, density, and code groups.  
While every code created provided relevant information, twenty-five codes with a 








Decision-Making, Information Sharing, Information 
Used, Mitigation Tactics, Selection of Process
5
Decison-making 32 10 Decision-Making, Mitigation Tactics 2
Training 43 9 Experience and Expertise, Training 2
Best practices
22 5
Decision-Making, Information Sharing, Information 
Used, Mitigation Tactics
4
Qualifications 13 5 Experience and Expertise, Training 2
Group think
30 4
Decision-Making, Information Sharing, Information 









Decision-Making, Information Used, Mitigation 
Tactics
3
How events shift area's 
atmosphere
11 4




Decision-Making, Information Sharing, Perceptions 
of Risk
3
Data analysis 21 3 Decision-Making, Information Used 2
Individual interpretations 14 3 Decision-Making, Perceptions of Risk 2
Certification 12 3 Experience and Expertise, Training 2
Probability 10 3 Decision-Making, Information Used 2
Sharing of information
17 2
Decision-Making, Experience and Expertise, 




Decision-Making, Selection of Process
2
Different levels of training 10 2 Experience and Expertise, Training 2




Experience and Expertise, Perceptions of Risk, 
Selection of Process
3
Subjectivity 27 1 Information Sharing, Information Used 2
Determination of risk 23 1 Decision-Making, Perceptions of Risk 2
League recommendations
17 1
Information Sharing, Information Used
2
Editing of assessment 11 1 Decision-Making, Selection of Process 2
Discretion 10 1 Experience and Expertise, Mitigation Tactics 2  
 
Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
 This thesis applied grounded theory methodology to a collection of interviews 
conducted with leaders in the sports security field (Charmaz, 2014).  The researcher 
generated codes within the data that focused on the risk process as the evaluators’ 
understand it. The identified codes facilitated the theoretical development explaining 
subjective and objective foundations used in the risk assessment process.  This chapter 
first focuses on the selection of risk assessment methodology among different venues and 




Additionally, the qualifications and level of expertise needed in order to complete 
assessments are explored.  The actual decision-making practices are discussed by 
focusing primarily on the identification of risk, evaluation among risk professionals, 
utilization of probability methods, prioritization of risk, and use of training exercises and 
how all these elements shape the final report.  Finally, the mitigation tactics chosen by 
organizations are considered by taking a closer look at how stakeholders and availability 
of resources influence recommendations of risk management from evaluators. 
Selection of Process: 
Threats fluctuate event to event, location to location, facility to facility; therefore, 
venue operators have to set a designated standard for security based on their specific 
venue’s capacity and location (Hall et al., 2012). Currently, there is minimal legislation 
existing that mandates stadium operators to follow international or national safety and 
security standards (Hall et al., 2012).  The ISO (2009) provides a basic framework from 
which organizations are meant to develop a risk assessment process applicable to their 
individual facilities; however, the framework provided by ISO is so arbitrary that it is 
almost completely left up to the organization to determine the best methods to conduct 
their risk assessment.  The International Standard encourages organizations to implement 
consistent practices to identify and manage risk, but in reality, the assessment process is 
relatively fluid and inconsistent in nature both on the individual level and within the 
sports security industry as a whole (ISO, 2009).  When interviewees were asked about 
their organization’s methodology, respondents stated that none of their organizations 




circumstances surrounding the venue and event being evaluated.  One respondent with 
over thirty years of law enforcement experience stated: 
So, baseball uses-there's different models that they use. They don't really stick to 
any one model in response to your question. There's you know, there's risk, there's 
different risk analysis methodology that people subscribe to. So, I think most of 
them combine a little bit of everything. And then you know for us, obviously, a 
lot of it ultimately centers around some kind of assessment of business continuity 
of if an event takes place how do we continue to function as a team and to get 
beyond any particular event.1 
The methods which organizations choose to utilize for their facility varies from venue to 
venue.  Their goals remain the same, but the approach to accomplishing the goals set 
forth are different.  Since organizations approach risk differently from one another, the 
risks identified, analyzed, and managed have the potential to be dramatically dissimilar 
simply due to the information utilized and margin in which that information is expended 
to draw conclusions.  A respondent further supported this notion when discussing best 
practices by stating: 
…the communication within the industry and law enforcement kind of led us to 
look at what the best practices [are] for us. And every place you're going to go to, 
it's going to have a different set of circumstances. 
Risk identification and mitigation are relatively dependent on the methods chosen by the 
organization.  The objective is to collect as much information as possible from various 
sources such as data from agencies and outside recommendations to generate an 
                                                 




assessment that is complete and best represents the contexts established by the venue.  
According to ISO (2009), in order for the overall process chosen to be effective, the 
methodology must submit to all three sections of the risk management framework.  One 
respondent elaborated on the usage of multiple assessments by claiming: 
Well, it's good to get different ones. Some venues will only do one type of 
assessment. You have DHS come out and just do one looking at terrorism. That's 
great. What about theft? What about you know transportation? About bio? What 
about food protection? There's so many different things that you can do and think 
about, so it's better to have all these different ones come in and give you an 
assessment. 
With large variety of risks to identify, evaluate, and analyze, comes various risk 
assessments tailored to focus on specific areas relevant to the facility.  Whether the 
organization chooses to utilize multiple assessments or not is up to them.  By not using 
more than one assessment, there is a greater possibility of overlooking threats or 
misappropriating identified risks. 
Security and safety protocols adapt based on the event and its draw rather than the 
venue itself.  The venue is the vulnerable structure, but the individuals visiting are the 
priority.  The more people or attention brought to an event, the closer personnel will work 
to maintain safety and security.  A respondent commented on the indefiniteness of the 
mitigation process by stating, “I mean there might be some things we get softer on and 
then there may be some events we get harder on.”  By saying this, the respondent 




Another respondent with 25 years of law enforcement experience reinforces the claims 
made by the previous respondent by saying:  
So we use the same ops plan for it and we just populate the fields differently 
based, on you know, what event, the crowd size expected, any kind of trends, any 
kind of threats that have been made to the event, and if there's something that 
really pings and looks a little funny, we get together and really dig into it deeply. 
Or if it's going to be a very largely populated event, we dig into it really deeply 
and just make sure we're extra careful. 
The influence of participation at the event is a determining factor in how attentive to risks 
the evaluators choose to be when going through the assessment process.  Another 
respondent maintained this conception by commenting on the influence of crowd size 
further: 
A volleyball game or match is played at the same venue as the basketball game, 
but the basketball game brings 8,000 people whereas the volleyball game would 
bring, I mean, frankly, a hundred fifty. A lot of them are parents too. It just 
doesn't have the draw. So yeah, we-manpower would be different. I wouldn't have 
the 20 people working that we would at basketball and I'm just talking 20 police. 
A lot of that has to do with traffic, getting pedestrians across an intersection 
where the parking decks are. We don't have those worries when the volleyball 
team is playing because 15 people at a time can just go on crosswalks and cross 




Not only does the crowd size effect the evaluators’ attitudes towards the assessment 
process, but it also impacts the number of staffing and mitigation techniques 
implemented during the event. 
Influence of Events: 
In risk society, there is a core focus on danger and constant skepticism that 
management of such dangers is being done (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  This communal 
fear among members of society has shaped how not only the public perceives risk but 
also how evaluators know and understand it.  Acts of terrorism such as 9/11, Munich 
Olympics hostage situation, and Athens Olympics bombing have made individuals more 
aware of possible risks associated with events and large structures (Hall et al. 2012).  
When discussing the evolution of risk assessment and impact world events have had on 
it, one respondent stated: 
So as these things have unfortunately happened more and more nationally and 
internationally, the whole, I mean, the whole risk assessment field or the threat 
assessment field has just boomed so it is a constant driver in situations with police 
departments trying to protect their citizenry. So it's evolved with the events. By 
events, I mean the bad acts. 
Society became more cognizant of the vulnerabilities associated with large 
structures and events through the continual attention being given to extreme acts of 
terrorism.  Science defines risk while the public perceives it (Beck, 1992).  The public’s 
lack of acceptance for the scientific definition of risk is not reflective of an illogicality 




made within scientific and technical declarations (Beck, 1992).  One respondent stated 
how their cognizance of risk has evolved over time: 
I think that over my career, I've just become more aware, more vigilant, taking a 
look at risk that anything could possibly affect an event that we're at. 
Another respondent mirrored the previous respondent’s notion of awareness increasing 
over time by reflecting on past events that have shaped their own understanding of risks: 
I just don't ever remember there would be shootings, but not where somebody 
came in and just indiscriminately just wanted to kill people. So over the course of 
my career those trends, I mean, the terrorism both internationally that we're 
talking about or you're having foreign nationals come over here and fly planes 
into buildings and go into the Pulse Nightclub and shoot up people, and in 
California, they were shooting at that company-their Christmas party yelling 
"Allah Akbar." That's kind of stuff was all new over the course of my career, and 
then towards the end of my career the whole driving up and running over people 
thing became a thing and that just, I mean, you have to be ever vigilant. 
The respondent discusses their observation of risks as they appear to be more present 
over the course of his or her career.  Effects from events such as active shooter incidents 
and acts of terrorism have shaped the respondent’s current perception of risk and what 
threat means in terms of structures and participants.  The risks, however, have always 
been there.  Throughout history, there have been countless tragedies, such as the 1989 
Hillsborough Stadium Disaster and 1985 Bradford Fire, that have occurred at large 
venues, including sporting facilities (Hall et al., 2012). It is not the risks that have 




vulnerabilities that have altered.  This has led to more involved and sensitive evaluation.  
Another respondent commented on this progression of assessment sparked by world 
events by stating: 
Oh, it's totally changed. It's increased it, matter of fact. I mean, there wasn't really 
event management, so say, security event management to the extreme it is now 20 
years ago. I mean, you had security. You had police, but it wasn't to what it is 
now. I mean, you weren't looking for-mostly it was just to get the drunk out of the 
building or something of that nature, but now it's, I mean, you have to encompass 
so much more. Why is that bag sitting there to that drunk so, I mean you got to get 
up just to another level. 
Respondents further expanded on this concept by explaining the mentality of risk 
professionals prior to society becoming aware of threats such as acts of terrorism: 
Well, I mean, it's-everybody really evolved at the same time, so I can tell you 25 
years ago when we-when there were events like that, there was no real risk 
assessment. The only concern was like, "Hey, we've got to get these people across 
the street, so I need some guy to stand intersection to make sure they don't get run 
over by just a drunk driver or somebody who's running a red light." 
According to the respondent, risk professionals lacked a sense of hyper-vigilance and 
attitudes towards risk were relatively mild in comparison to today.  People in society 
believe they are more visible to risk than those before and that the exposure and risks 
present are persistently getting worse (Slovic, 1999).  Shifts in the definition of risk by 
organizations and public perceptions within the past twenty to thirty years molded the 




Perception of Risk: 
Trust is a state of mind that evolves from the actions people take rather than what 
they say.  Organizations have to communicate honestly, respect knowledge, skills, and 
abilities of other individuals, sustain confidentiality, and maintain unguarded exchanges 
(Hall et al., 2012).  While they must maintain and improve the public’s trust, they must 
also be able to trust the individuals involved in the risk process.  When asked about 
trusting those involved in the process, one respondent remarked: 
…you've got to rely on a lot of people, and you've got to know who you've got 
there. What their background is and that goes all the way down to who gets the 
credentials from athletic staff. 
By trusting those conducting the evaluation and others involved in the implementation of 
decisions, the organization recognizes their background and ability to determine risks at 
the venue based on the evaluator’s understanding of the goals and objectives of the 
organization. 
In a large portion of the interviews, there was mention of at least one additional 
assessment being used in conjunction with an internal evaluation.  Gathering more than 
one assessment is meant to help generate a more thorough, complete evaluation.  If 
people perceive risks differently, a combination of several assessments by different 
agencies both internal and external are supposed to level out one specific group’s 
perceptions by providing multiple interpretations of the same environment.  There is 
expected to be overlap between these assessments, but each assessment is unique in itself 
because it could offer a new perspective on the topic and offer different solutions. It is up 




to implement as a result of these assessments.  The more input placed in the assessment, 
the more objective the assessment appears to be because multiple people are giving their 
input.  A respondent stated decisions regarding effective mitigation “… comes from 
looking at the problem and then talking to other sources and try to figure out what's 
within our realm of possibility to mitigate it.”  If the internal assessment and 
supplementary assessments all report relatively the same vulnerabilities, people view the 
overall assessment as a comprehensive document that accurately reflects the risks 
associated with the venue. 
A moderate degree of subjectivity in the review process is thought to be beneficial 
in reducing misconceptions because evaluators who do not follow the herding trend will 
ultimately offer new information and insight to the report (Park, Peacey, & Munafo, 
2014). However, the approach mentioned above is more than moderately subjective 
because it focuses primarily on individual thoughts and recommendations of risk coming 
together to create a better understanding of the venue and its vulnerabilities.  A 
respondent discussed the benefits of having both novice and experienced individuals take 
part in the assessment process: 
So, I think when you hear a new view, that that can be very refreshing and they 
can see something that you don't see. And when you give them some experience 
that you've been through, they're like, "Wow, I didn't even think of that." So, 
combining both can really make you a much better assessor as a team. 
The respondent also mentions how experience can provide a form of enlightenment for 
novice evaluators.  According to the statements made by the respondent, experience is 




backgrounds can still contribute, but having some experience gives the evaluator a better 
understanding and mindfulness of the risks being investigated. 
Risk discourse fosters uncertainty and forces the public to trust experts’ 
knowledge of risk as the best method of appraising threats and hazards (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997).  The public trusts the judgment of experts regardless if their own 
experiences support the expert’s findings (Austen, 2009).  One respondent commented on 
how their personal experience and opinions guide the evaluation process at team 
meetings: 
Well, since I run the risk assessment meeting, I-it does help kind of shape the 
meeting, but again, like I said, I'm very open and I listen to all of the different 
views. So, my personal experiences and my opinions of what's happened over the 
years, I throw them out there because I want people to hear them, but I also want 
to listen to others and make sure that we use all of these opinions in the room to 
make a thorough assessment. 
The respondent’s experience and opinions set the tone for the entire process at that 
particular venue and heavily influence the end result.  While the respondent allows input 
from multiple persons, his or her perceptions are more prevalent in the discussion 
because they are running the meeting.  Another respondent mentioned how experience 
can impact risk management decisions by stating: 
…so we allow law enforcement to come in, sworn officers, if they have their 
badge, their ID. We sign them in and get their seat location and tell them to come 
back to that same location if something happens so that we can deploy them. A lot 




it, our football stadium, because it's owned by a different owner. The security 
director over there has had bad experience with friendly fire. When he was a cop, 
there was some friendly fire, but it was bad. So he's always nervous about having 
guns and alcohol mix, but we tell our cops when they come in, "You can't drink. 
You know this already. You can't-you're a cop. You can't drink while you're here 
with your gun on. So, enjoy the game come back here if there's a problem.” We've 
never had a problem. Other venues may have had problems. That's why they have 
different policies, but we've talked to the cops coming in. They all know. 
While the respondent’s organization allows off-duty sworn officers to enter their facility 
armed, another organization does not because someone did not have a positive experience 
with firearms.  The disparity between the two mitigation tactics demonstrates how 
important experience and perception are in the assessment and management process. 
Training and Expertise: 
 Individuals within the organization rely heavily on training and observations of 
risk to conduct the bulk of their assessments.  Experience and judgement drive the 
assessment process. Without it, the evaluator may not feel competent enough to conduct 
the evaluation his or herself. They feel the need to utilize third parties to complete the 
assessment.  Evaluators trust their training and experience to the point where they would 
rather conduct a whole assessment without the aid of a governmental third party such as 
DHS.  One respondent who supports this notion said: 
Now, if I didn't have this experience, I might have to look at bringing in 
Homeland Security, State or Federal Homeland Security to help me do this. And 




facilities just as a whole just to come look at it as a whole, but if I didn't have all 
this experience, then yeah, I may have to have them help me do the whole thing. 
But with experience and training, I'm lucky enough here to be able to say "hey we 
can manage it." 
Trusting one’s own experience and training rather than seeking additional aid gives room 
for an increased utilization of subjectivity from a small group of individuals rather than 
developing a collective agreement among various groups about the risks present.  By only 
conducting an internal evaluation, there is a higher probability of overlooking a risk and 
inputting a larger margin of bias in the report. 
A court decision made on April 29, 2008 established certain requirements for 
facilities on notice for the possibility of a terrorist attack by demanding organizations 
aware of the risk take “reasonable” steps to mitigate it (Hall et al., 2012).  The decision 
changed the liability landscape for all environments that possess potential terrorist threat 
by focusing on whether operators are aware of the threat and if the venue possesses 
reasonable and necessary mitigation tactics.  In light of the decision, sport operators were 
charged with the responsibility to be proactive rather than reactive to such threats by 
communicating with other agencies and facilities and applying principles within the 
Department of Homeland Security’s SAFETY act (Hall et al., 2012).  The interviewees 
were asked what qualifications are needed for a risk assessor to conduct an evaluation at 
their respective venues.  All the responses mentioned one or both categories: proper 
certification or training and a certain degree of experience.  This notion is similar to 
Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) definition of a risk professional.  According to Ericson 




of abstract knowledge addressing risk concerns and providing expert risk management 
recommendations.  One respondent stated an individual is qualified “…through 
background, through experiences, through education, through certification such as like 
the safety act-DHS safety act. Things like that.”  Another respondent said: 
So, to have a risk-if we have a third party do a risk assessment for us, then, we 
make sure they have all the qualifications, meaning that they're actually certified 
to do a risk assessment, that they have previous experience doing risk 
assessments, and that they've provided us documentation of previous risk 
assessments that they've done. Meaning not necessarily a confidential document, 
but "hey, we did a risk assessment on a Major League Baseball facility and these-
this is some of the feedback we provided." Again, nothing specific, but showing 
us that they have conducted it, that they do have the experience, and a lot of these 
come with-we take a look at their backgrounds, meaning the individual who's 
actually conduct the risk assessment, so whether they were in law enforcement for 
twenty years, or they were-what kind of education they got, backgrounds like that. 
It is evident that in order for an organization to trust the individuals evaluating the venue, 
the appropriate parties must have some recognizable certification and experience with 
assessments.  Inexperienced persons tend to consider risk in broader terms in comparison 
to those who identify as experts (Austen, 2009).  Another respondent reinforces the idea 
that a surveyor needs to possess suitable credentials in order to be acceptable for use by 
the organization by stating: 
That's a tricky thing. The government only sends out their people, so you, I mean, 




will come out and do a risk assessment for you, but who trained them? Where are 
they from? Are they just some guy who took a class. I mean, you want someone 
from the Department of Homeland Security, someone who's been involved in 
planning attacks and defending attacks. That's what you want. 
The respondent would rather have someone who is trained by Homeland Security 
specifically and deemed an expert by DHS because they do not want to select someone 
any person who claims they can conduct an assessment.  Based on this response, it 
appears the training programs for risk assessors are not always trustworthy and are 
ambiguous at times depending on the program, so anyone interested in risk assessment 
can take a class and think they understand how to identify and analyze risks. 
In regard to training, there were mixed responses on how people are trained to be 
risk evaluators.  One respondent stated the training came primarily through the police 
academy and a few classes that occur every now and again: 
Now, when you talk about on the structural side of things and guarding structures, 
there would be some basic stuff that would go on in the police academy itself, just 
very basic stuff as part of their just a very basic of training, but the more in-depth 
stuff where they really learned how to target hard, there were really only a few 
people that would go to these training classes. We try to get as many people into it 
as we could, but that was not always the-the training does not come around all 
that often and it fills up really quick. 
While the respondent discusses the training received in the police academy and 
occasional classroom training, it is important to note that not every risk assessor is a 




mentioning additional training that is accredited by the state and designated assessment 
groups: 
They [risk assessors] went through specialized training and got accredited in that 
subject field as well. So they had-they went to specialized school, specialized 
classes, where they learned how to do that kind of stuff and were qualified based 
on the state, based on getting those accreditations to go into a place and give 
opinions on where you had issues and where you didn't...I are already talked 
about ATAP, the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals. You could get 
different levels of training with them, but you could also take a course and then a 
test and I'm trying to think of what the name of it was but it was a specialized 
designation which basically meant that you're kind of like a master assessor and 
I'm probably using the wrong terminology. 
Evaluators can attend various trainings from different entities and receive some form of 
certification recognized by the State or other organizations, but there is no designated 
training program mandated for all assessors to attend.  For others, training is conducted 
internally through a variety of courses.  Another respondent stated: 
So we have a training matrix, so it's different levels…All of our security staff take 
ICS 100, 200, 700, 800. Those are all FEMA classes. They have to go through a 
four hour-all colleagues go through a four-hour orientation. So that's a welcome to 
the [arena], welcome to our company, sexual harassment policy, if you get injured 
on the job, how do you punch in and punch out, what the dress code is, the 
attendance policy, all that. And then we talked a little bit about during that four 




"See Something, Say Something," but we talk about this is, what a bomb looks 
like, this is the four components of bomb, these are some of the things-a lone 
wolf, improvised explosive devices. 
It appears there is no designated training mandated for everyone who claims to be an 
assessor to attend and get certified.  Training courses are either accredited by the State, a 
Federal agency, or entity groups designed to advance the knowledge of assessors.  This 
demonstrates that the type of training and quality of training received varies within the 
field, making the risk assessment process convoluted with individuals who may or may 
not be taught “proper” assessment methods.   
Risk professionals claim to possess exclusive abstract knowledge of the best ways 
to tackle risks and provide risk management services as experts in their field (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997).  Such individuals are expected to be reflexive enough to effectively 
identify an issue and firm enough to discontinue considerations of risk and take action 
(Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  Risk professionals ultimately control the definition of risk 
and the objectives established within their respective organizations (Slovic, 1999). 
Interviewees were asked what makes an expert an “expert” and the overarching response 
was: 
Through experiences. I mean, really through experiences. I think if you've-you 
didn't look at something one time and something took place, then obviously you're 
going to look at it the next time. 
The response shows that security operators believe risk expert to be someone who is 




identify a risk and make recommendations on how to handle them.  When asked at what 
point is someone experienced enough to be deemed an expert, one respondent claimed: 
The tipping point is different. I mean, literally, you can't say "everyone after 10 
years of experience and 10 years in law enforcement and 4 years of college." I 
think you have to be kind of open-minded and really kind of do some research on 
what the individual or the company. If it's a third party company, what they've 
done as a whole. I just don't think there's a tipping point that says "hey, after five 
years" or "we've been in business for eight years or twelve years and we've done 
30 different risk assessments that makes us qualified to handle what I want them 
to do." I take a good look at them, get as much information as I possibly can, and 
I really love to rely on other sources, meaning people I know or companies that I 
know or organizations that I know that have used the same company I'm looking 
at because if they've gotten a thorough, a very thorough written documentation of 
a risk assessment, that also helps me in my decision. 
The rate at which an individual accumulates quality experiences that hone their skills and 
broaden their perceptions of risk is inconsistent between individuals because not 
everyone lives the same life.  With this in mind, the acceptability of expertise is relative.  
How one decides to convey they have enough life and career experience was not 
mentioned, but it would be up to the organization to determine if the experience disclosed 
is sufficient enough to conduct an assessment.  Discussions between different 
organizations who have used the evaluator in question validate the organization’s 






Identification of Risk 
 Personal attitudes towards risk kickstart the assessment process and influence the 
evaluators’ theories of what risks exist at a particular venue and the methods to best 
manage them.  Evaluators, then, seek to obtain objective data such as trends and incident 
reports to provide some form of contextual support or rejection of notions previously 
determined by the evaluator.  The data can possibly be manipulated or misinterpreted to 
support opinions that are solely those of the evaluator and not necessarily reflective of the 
organization, venue, or actual threats present. Information includes, but is not limited to, 
statistical reports, news, facts, judicial decisions, and formal reports while knowledge is 
referred to as the interpretation of context, relatedness, and conceptualization (Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997). Information being analyzed should be the best available to the 
organization, and the general methods should be systematic and timely in nature.  The 
overall process creates better-informed decision-makers that can more appropriately 
prioritize and weigh mitigation tactics (ISO, 2009).  One respondent referred to their 
organization’s use of third-party assessment as a way to essentially confirm theories of 
risk that the organization had already recognized: 
He [the third party assessor] came through and he risk assessed the building for us 
and we have his assessment on file and based on that, based on frankly our own 
assessment because a lot of what he does is a lot of common sense and we kind of 
figured it out on our own. We put up certain barriers. 
By confirming what the organization had previously observed, the third-party evaluation 




countermeasures.  By using information from other sources to support preconceived 
notions of risk, these organizations can confirm their theories of risks affecting the 
facility. 
In addition to third party assessments, organizations refer to information collected 
by other agencies on trends and best practices.  According to one respondent, sharing 
information between agencies is crucial to understanding risks: 
He [my boss] believes we should all get around the table and talk about things. 
And he's the first one to-he'll go to some other venues to see what they're doing, 
and then he'll share openly with them what we're doing and get a better 
understanding. 
Sharing of information within the sports security industry helps the industry develop a 
more uniform conceptualization of risk among security professionals. Beck (1992) states, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, the management of risk creates an oversimplified perception 
between theory and practice, across disciplines, and between opinions and factual 
information.  Information used during the assessment process can be from a myriad of 
sources.  When asked what kind of information the interviewees’ organizations analyze, 
the primary answer revolved around some form of intel gathering between different 
departments.  One respondent commented: 
…we evaluate numerous things. Whether it's a give-away at a game because that 
produces more fans, whether it's an FBI report, a DHS report, a local police 
stating "hey, this is what's been going on in the area," worldwide events such as 




of incidents that have taken place. We use all kinds of things. It's not just a set 
boom, boom, boom. 
Another respondent echoed the previous respondent’s answer to utilization of information 
by stating: 
We have some people that you-we have a lot of years of expertise, some in 
baseball, some in law enforcement, so we put all that together. And we also use-
we'll pull police data, FBI data, DHS data, so we use both. 
When venues ask for reports and information from other entities such as the FBI and 
DHS, the type of material gathered can either be subjective or objective in nature.  One 
respondent’s remarks discussed how they go about asking different agencies for 
information: 
We'll work with the FBI, ATF, Homeland Security, joint terrorism task force, and 
we'll sit down with them before football season two to three months before and 
say, "Okay. What we do we have going on in the area that we need to be aware 
of? What is some risk assessment? What is some suspicious-what kind-some 
cases you're working on? Not so say who or what, but if you get-have you got a-
are you working a possible terrorism case in this area? You work-is there an 
armed robbery spree going on in the area? Is there property crime? Is there some 
auto burglaries going on the west side of town?” We do all that assessment of 
what's going on, even what's going on here. 
When groups of individuals are asked by the organization if there are any threats or 
trends they should be aware of, the agency can either supply the organization with 




provide data in the form of statistics and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).  The 
uncertainty of which form of information available for collection by the evaluator makes 
the evaluation process even more subjective. 
 Some organizations try to collect data internally by documenting incidents and 
statistical evidence.  One respondent elaborated on one of the methods their organization 
utilizes to file incidents that occur at their stadium: 
So we have an ISS 24/7, that is the leader in event management & event incident 
reporting. Most of the teams-probably 90% of the teams use it. It allows you to 
log everything coming in. Deliveries, incidents, medicals, you name it. We track 
all of our colleagues coming in by access control system that we have, and then 
for guests, it allows any time a guest has an incident, we can track it and keep it 
on the summary. 
By referring back to the data collected over a period of time, evaluators can observe 
trends within the venue in question in addition to applying information from outside 
sources.  Application and quantity of information obtained can vary depending on the 
organization.  One respondent commented on this when referring to preferences for 
looking at risks from a “realistic” perspective rather than solely relying on numerical data 
by saying “…that's the constant battle back and forth is I'd rather look at in realistic terms 
and these guys tend to sometimes just look at it in black and white numbers.”  Even when 
there is numerical, objective data available, some evaluators still prefer to rely on their 







Rational people process all available information that can be provided prior to 
making a decision.  A rational individual can and should be impacted by what other 
individuals think in order to support or reject personal opinions regarding similar topics 
(Park, Peacey, & Munafo, 2014).  Early findings within the process can be rebutted by 
subsequent evidence, allowing the formation of groups that interpret the same evidence in 
significantly dissimilar ways.  This occurrence may lead to convergence of false 
hypotheses (Park, Peacey, & Munafo, 2014).  A respondent noted how the evaluation 
process takes into account everyone’s positions on the vulnerability as the venue and how 
it affects mitigation: 
…it's a matter of we believe everything should be implemented and if it-best 
practices, if there's something that changes, then that's obviously with the chain of 
command within the organization. But if it's a strong feeling that people feel 
really strong about it, then, the decision is usually made; if it's not there at that 
meeting, it will go up through the chain of command all the way up to the highest 
possible all the way up to the owners and it comes back down to us. Hopefully 
with the right decision. 
If someone strongly believes that a certain risk is present at the facility, it is usually 
incorporated into the assessment regardless of whether other individuals agree or disagree 
with the notion.  However, the chain of command within the organization ultimately 
determines the legitimacy of those perceptions.  One respondent shed some light as to 




We have an internal security risk assessment committee that's made up of 
executives and myself and representatives from our insurance company. So if 
there's a major problem, we meet, and we meet at least once before the season and 
once after the season, but for any major problems, we would meet-conduct an 
unscheduled meeting. So that would be the first way we would look at it and then 
typically a lot of that falls on me to-if something's identified is to immediately 
determine the best remedy so often times I'll look at outside sources. 
When executives in the security branch determine risks present, the decisions made are 
influenced by the individuals at the meeting and the upper chain of command’s ideas on 
how to treat identified risks. 
Differing expert judgements, ambiguity, and quality, quantity, or obtainability of 
information can affect analysis of risks identified at any particular facility (ISO, 2009). 
Peer review should diminish the number of concerns addressed, but if the review process 
is often not conducted correctly.  In order for peer review to be effective, evaluators have 
to safeguard the quality and legitimacy of scientific information (Park, Peacey, & 
Munafo, 2014).  When asked if the assessors usually agree with one another’s assertions 
of risk, one respondent stated: 
Yeah, and it's maybe not necessarily an agreement, but it's an awareness. That's 
what I kind of like to make it is that when you have a risk assessment, not 
everybody has to agree that such and such is a risk, but everyone becomes aware 
of it. So, the awareness and what we need to do to mitigate that risk, that's what's 




I think everyone becomes aware of what potentially someone in the group thinks 
is a risk and then no matter what, we are gonna try to mitigate that risk. 
If someone on the assessment team identifies a risk that the other evaluators do not 
necessarily detect, the risk is placed in the overall assessment with little to no validation.  
Even if it is not seen as a primary risk designated by the entire group, reporting that at 
least one person observed it increases the organization’s alertness to the possibility it 
exists. 
Probability Methods 
Events that draw a sizeable amount of participation create a multitude of 
uncertainties and threats for governing (Jennings, 2012).  There is always a possibility 
that circumstances will change and bring rise of new risks relevant to the facility or 
decrease the presence of previously identified risks.  As circumstances change, 
organizations must update and improve the risk management process to fit the objectives 
of the organization (ISO, 2009).  When doing so, risk assessors look at the likelihood of 
certain risks impacting the venue.  Ideally, probability calculations minimize uncertainty 
to a level that the evaluator feels relatively assured in taking action (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997).  People assume probability and consequence of physical and natural processes can 
be quantified objectively in the risk assessment process; however, social science analysis 
challenges this notion by declaring risk as fundamentally subjective (Slovic, 1999).  
While probability of occurrence can be established quantitatively or qualitatively, 
subjectively or objectively, most security operators predominantly utilize a more 




every respondent claimed their organization uses them, but not on a regular basis. A 
respondent’s comments on probability usage support this notion by stating: 
I wouldn't say every time, but I think if there's something that rises to that need, 
then we will-we're not afraid to use a probability method… I'm trying to think of a 
good example. Like I can't think of one off the top of my head, but you know, we-
different GARs. I mean, we've used different GAR methods and something ends 
up in the red, then obviously, it's a probability method. 
For most, the probability methods are entirely subjective because they rely on 
expert judgement rather than statistical trends and reports to determine the likelihood of 
an event happening.  One respondent explained how their particular organization 
approaches likelihood by saying: 
I wouldn't say mathematical. It's more of, "What do we know? What's the 
common trends? What do we know? What [does] this group like to do? What's 
that group like to do? What's popular with them? What's the hot things going on 
in this area?" 
In these situations, deciding the likelihood of an event occurring is dependent on the 
experience of the individuals conducting the assessment and may eventually lead to a 
heavily subjective prioritization of risks in the mitigation stages.  Additionally, 
probability can be influenced by criteria established from other sources.  One respondent 
mentions this by stating: 
We don't necessarily use a numeric ranking system, but we do prioritize and 




stadium operating practices criteria which is heavily set around the SAFETY Act, 
the Department of Homeland Security SAFETY Act. 
While some organizations utilize guiding principles set forth by other entities, others rely 
on expert opinion to determine the probability of risks at the venue.  The overall 
determination of probability then influences the prioritization of those risks from 
tolerable to unacceptable. 
Prioritization of Risk 
Risk cannot be completely eradicated from any particular venue, but it can be 
minimized, transferred, or evaded through prioritization driven by the established 
objectives of the organization (NCS4, 2018).  Based on ISO’s (2009) definition, the 
expression of risk is dependent on the identified objectives of the organization and varies 
from organization to organization.  Evaluators determine the level of tolerability for risks 
identified from the assessment and distributed within the facility as a manner of control 
(Beck, 1992).  When asked how prioritization is conducted at interviewees’ respective 
facilities, there was a mix of responses that discussed their process, but the approaches 
mentioned still maintained various levels of subjectivity via knowledge and judgement of 
risks.  One respondent stated: 
I mean, we don't necessarily rank things, but we sit around. We have a meeting, 
like I said, and uh first of all, we all have an opportunity to look at a lot of the 
information. So, we come in to the meeting with a pretty good knowledge of what 
we think might be some risk that we may need to mitigate, and then, we sit there 




the table and on the conference call and there's a lot of data that goes around. So, 
it's a pretty thorough process. 
For this particular approach, there is a substantial amount of reliability on expertise and 
individual interpretations of information gathered during the assessment.  Another 
respondent’s account of their prioritization process stems from criteria set forth by DHS 
and experience: 
It is expert knowledge. It is based off of the RSAT. That's the first one that we did 
that was government done. We bring them in. They do it, and we use that same 
rating system for our assessments because once again, the safety act because that 
question would come up as to the Department Homeland Security say, "How do 
you rate your-how was your assessment done? How was the rating done?" We go, 
"We use your system." Can't argue. "We use your system. So you can't say this a 
bad system lets you're saying your system is bad." We're using the Department of 
Homeland Security rating system. So that's what we use. 
Both approaches utilize the thoughts and opinions of experts but in different ways.  While 
one approach focuses on the group’s analyzation of data through discussion at a meeting, 
the other applies criteria for ranking from a specific framework and uses expert 
knowledge to categorize risks using the respective benchmarks. 
Use of Operational Exercises 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Exercise and Evaluation Program, 
commonly referred to as HSEEP, contains seven discussion-based exercises.  Within the 
program, there are two routes operators can choose to utilize.  One of which is functional 




relatively difficult course of action to conduct due to circumstances surrounding the 
venue such as quantity of resources available. Instead, most venues utilize seminars, 
workshops, game simulations, and tabletop exercises (TTX) to validate current practices, 
identify gaps in resource allocation, and clarify roles of staff and partners (Hall et al., 
2012). When discussing these exercises, one respondent explained how the program can 
aid security professionals with observing the practicality of current mitigation tactics: 
Every time we have a table top, the next two weeks, I'm getting questions from all 
these Vice Presidents saying, "Oh yeah, that was really great. You know, I want 
to learn more." But it gives you a chance to poke holes where you know you're 
vulnerable, and then see if people will respond. 
Every respondent mentioned using tabletop exercises as a means to account for current 
practices and validate their applications to the venue.  In addition to TTXs, some venues 
utilize drills such as random screening checks to accomplish the same goal of inspecting 
effectiveness of countermeasures. One respondent discussed this further by stating: 
…they [auditors] come over and I'm sure they collect data on that with the 
numbers. But they're coming over. They're testing a door to see if they can get in 
with-the common thing, we do is we put cell phone in the front pocket with a 
knife. Walk through the metal detector and go, "Oh!" They say, "Right here, you 
went off right here on the side." You pull out your phone and go it was my phone 
and they go, "Okay, you're good." No, they're supposed to stop, rescan that area 
with the phone out, and then see that the knife is there. That's the most common 




couple of our screeners and see if it'll work. See if we can get through. If we do 
get through, then we pull them aside and retrain them. 
When inconsistencies are observed using these exercises, security operators are 
responsible for implementing corrective actions to fix recognized issues. 
Mitigation 
Stakeholder influence 
Social, political, cultural, economic, natural, financial, or legal factors can 
influence the external context that evaluators account for.  Relationships with both 
internal and external stakeholders can impact the context through stakeholders pushing 
their personal perceptions on the assessment team (ISO, 2009).  Negative stakeholders 
reject the entire process and decisions made, and positive stakeholders immerse 
themselves in the identification and management process by offering consultation from 
beginning to end (NCS4, 2018).  While stakeholders may not be able to “edit” the 
assessment document, they do hold some influence over the process itself in regards to 
approaches of risk and mitigation.  When the assessment and management processes are 
conducted separately, influence from stakeholders can decrease slightly, allowing the 
evaluators to consider risks exclusively (Pasman & Rogers, 2018).  One respondent 
hinted at this when discussing the clear bag policy: 
I'm not a big proponent of the clear bag policy… And it's not that I'm against the 
clear bag policy. I'm for it if it's league mandated. If the NBA and NHL say, 
"We're going to clear bag policy." I am 100%. I think it's the most effective way 




compartments in a clear bag. Hundred percent agree. It's the safest way to go. But 
if you're not going to mandate it by the league, it's tough. 
 Despite the respondent agreeing that the clear bag policy is effective and a helpful 
mitigation tactic for collecting contraband during the screening process, they do not fully 
support it because the sports leagues associated with the venue do not mandate or 
recommend it to be a best practice.  Had the leagues recommended the clear bag policy, 
the respondent would most likely be on board with the mandate.  Lack of such a mandate 
influences how the respondent and other evaluators choose to manage the screening 
process. When stakeholders such as sports leagues dictate specific methods of mitigation 
as best practices, the organization typically abides by the standards established.  If there 
are multiple stakeholders influencing mitigation decisions, the standards are compared to 
determine the best out of the group.  A respondent expanded on the usage of 
recommended best practices by saying: 
So, NHL has a-they come out with what's called a NHL security standards and 
recommendations every year. We take from that, that says you must do screening, 
you must do this, you must provide security for parking for the bench, for locker 
rooms. NBA comes out with one as well a little bit more aggressive than the 
NHL. Then, we look at the baseball-even though this is an arena, we look at 
baseball and football and pull their best practices… We take all those best 
practices, and we put them all together on one big spreadsheet and say, "what's 
the best of each one?" And that's what we try to do. We don't just do the NHL 
version of what's best for screening. We'll do whatever is the highest of all the 




The decision as to which practice is the best out of a group is determined by which 
provides the higher level of security, and it is decided on by a small group of individuals 
who keep up with the changing recommendations on a yearly basis. 
Limitations of Resources 
Allocating resources to only identified risks with high risk scores is not 
necessarily the most ideal management technique limitations placed on budgeting and 
costs for countermeasures (Cox, 2008).  The mitigation process is impacted by the 
quantity of resources available to the venue.  Evaluators have to make decisions that are 
both practical and best for ensuring security.  When asked about utilization of resources 
and the mitigation process, one respondent stated: 
Everything we do is risk driven. That's what it's all about. We-because you can't 
stop everything. You have to make decisions, smart decisions, about what you're 
going to put your resources in. 
While some mitigation tactics may be the most ideal for guaranteeing safety and security, 
they may not be the most practical actions based on available resources and application.  
One respondent elaborated on this notion by stating: 
So yeah, you got to make decisions that are going to protect the most people the 
but are also feasible. Somebody may say, "You know, we need to? We need to 
you know encompass the [stadium] in one big brick wall that's 50 feet high." Like 
yeah, that would keep threats out, but that's not feasible and it's expensive. Can't 
do it. So we'd have to look at the idea that the person had or the suggestion and 




When resources are not readily available or solutions are not necessarily practical to 
apply to the venue, evaluators have to get imaginative in ways to handle risks.  A 
respondent recalled an occasion where they had to implement a creative solution to 
mitigate one of the organization’s chief concerns: 
I found some creative ways like when I came here, they had repeatedly had a 
stadium that it was identified as a risk to a vehicle-borne attack, especially against 
pedestrians and they had budgeted some money to put barriers in, but it really 
wasn't a practical solution. So I ended up talking to some different people looking 
at some different venues and we ended up landscaping the area and put giant 
boulders in there and making it a rock garden, which the fans think looks really 
great, but the reality of the matter is that each of those boulders is big enough to 
stop a fairly decent size small truck. 
Venues may not be able to uphold mitigation tactics the industry deems as most effective 
which allows security operators to generate their own versions of solutions to minimize 
risk. 
 From beginning to end, the risk assessment process is largely subjective.  There 
are various approaches to risk assessment that security operators can choose to utilize 
based on what they believe is best for their facility.  When selecting risk evaluators, 
security operators desire individuals with a relative amount of experience and training 
backed by local, state, or federal entities.  An evaluator’s perceptions of risk are subject 
to change based on witnessing or observing the impacts made by catastrophic world 
events like 9/11 or the Munich Olympics hostage situation.  Professional experiences, and 




in the same terms.  Evaluators regularly call upon their own experiences and judgements 
to assess venues, and several organizations call upon multiple evaluators’ 
recommendations to create a more holistic assessment of their venue.  While objective 
information such as trends, statistics, and reports obtained from internal and external 
sources are examined, this information is generally used to support or reject evaluators’ 
personal perceptions of risk.  When determining the probability of occurrence for 
identified risks, assessors utilize their own perceptions of likelihood more often than 
objective calculations.  These conclusions ultimately impact the prioritization of risks 
because threats with higher probability scores are more likely to be addressed when 
choosing mitigation tactics.  Risk management measures are impacted by stakeholders’ 
recommendations and best practices as well as availability of resources.  Evaluators must 
be realistic when choosing the best mitigation tactics by deciding upon what would 
minimize risks effectively based on the recommendations established by stakeholders and 
resources accessible to them. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 This thesis focused on how the influence of risk perceptions among sports 
security operators effect the overall risk assessment and management process.  
Throughout the sports security profession, risk assessments are viewed as relatively 
objective; however the information gathered demonstrated that such practices is almost 
entirely designed with an overt subjective influence.  While a moderate level of 
subjectivity is best for assessment, the risk process uses more than a moderate amount of 
subjectivity which can lead to misperceptions and false hypotheses of risk (Park, Peacey, 




methodology to fit their particular venue to the final decision-making and mitigation, 
subjectivity is present in high quantity by depending on the training and expertise of the 
individuals completing the review.  Information employed in the process ranges from 
expert opinions both internally and externally, trends reported from outside agencies, and 
internal data collection through the use of camera systems and incident reports.  While 
the decision-making process utilizes objective information provided by external partners 
and internal reports, expert opinion is more heavily relied on to commit to decisions. 
 The assessment methods chosen by the security operators include internal 
evaluation, external evaluation, or a mix of both.  While organizations use different forms 
of risk assessment methodologies, they all follow ISO’s (2009) standards for risk 
assessment.  Although risk assessment models exist, most of the participants stated they 
do not utilize models such as the RSAT for their facilities.  There are also different types 
of assessments that may review the overall risks or a specific category such as structural 
integrity, food and safety, or biological threats. They make determinations of risk based 
on observations from security staff at the venue and outside partners.  Along with 
observations and identification of risk from these parties, the operators collect a wide 
range of information from in-house data collection to interviews of external entities and 
their respective reports.  With internal evaluation, the security operators at the venue 
examine risks while being cognizant of the reputation of the facility, circumstances 
surrounding the area, and persons effected by risk decisions, and these assessments can 
hold a degree of bias.  External evaluation allows security operators to collect what they 
hope to be an unbiased interpretation of dangers existing within the area.  When the two 




overlap in results, the risks from the internal assessment are validated and mitigation 
tactics are implemented. 
 The risk assessment process has evolved over the course of the past two decades 
because unperceived risks of the past and their likelihood to occur have been exploited by 
individuals partaking in acts of terrorism such as bombings, active shooter incidents, and 
vehicle-rammings.  As a result, individual perceptions of risk have advanced to consider 
a broader conceptualization of risk and consequences.  Society has developed a sense of 
fear of danger and trusts security professionals to protect them from loss or injury when 
participating in events (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).  Everyone experiences risk 
differently, and these experiences are regularly called upon during risk assessments.  
Although likelihood of occurrence can be defined using qualitative, quantitative, 
subjective, or objective information, participants claimed to rarely use mathematical 
probability methods because they could draw conclusions themselves based on what they 
have experienced or observed in the past (NCS4, 2019).  This, in turn, is reflected greatly 
when evaluators prioritize risks that they believe should be mitigated. 
Throughout the process, evaluators communicate with one another to understand 
individual thoughts on threats at the venue and determine a collective report of these 
findings.  Risk assessment teams meet with one another to make conclusions on the risks 
identified, and any risks mentioned by a single individual can be discussed and inserted 
in the report simply to ensure the organization awareness of its possibility, regardless if 
other evaluators agree or not.  Conflicting expert judgements, uncertainty, and quality, 
quantity, and accessibility to information from different sources can impact the analysis 




created by keeping in mind past events on a global, national, and local scale as well as 
personal experiences and information gathered from internal and external parties.  A 
surveyor may already have an idea of what they believe to be existing threats by drawing 
on experiences and observations, but information accumulated from various sources can 
be used to further support their conceptions.  External evaluations are sometimes guided 
by security operators working at the facility, and these individuals influence the final 
results from the outside entity to confirm what they, the internal party, already deemed a 
risk.   
Expertise and training are the primary factors inspected for an organization to 
select evaluators.  Training on risk assessment can come from the local, state, or federal 
level, and specialized courses outside the police academy are limited in frequency.  
Organizations prefer persons to have at least one form of certification such as the 
SAFETY act certification from the Department of Homeland Security and a relative 
amount of experience conducting risk assessments.  Organizations will communicate 
with one another during the selection process to determine if the evaluator in question is 
qualified.  Recommendations from other venues are based on that organization’s opinions 
the evaluator’s performance at their facility and quality of their assessment. 
Limitations 
 The sample population was limited to the accessibility and availability of 
individuals established in the sports security domain.  Only 10 participants were 
interviewed for this study, which limited the amount of information obtained about risk 
practices and information generally utilized in the field. Additionally, individuals 




of security operations for their respective facilities.  To generate a more complete 
conclusion of the use of expert knowledge and interpretation compared to impartial data, 
sampling could take into account an increased number of risk professionals’ accounts of 
the assessment process.   
 The research was conducted by a single researcher.  Though grounded theory was 
applied to the data collected to create theories, the codes created by the researcher were 
determined based on their understanding of information discussed in interviews.  If 
another individual did the same study, they may have different codes, but they should still 
identify similar patterns as the researcher from this study. 
Future Research 
 Because this study was limited in quantity of participants, the same research could 
be conducted with an increase in sample size to get a better picture of how subjectivity 
and objectivity are distributed in the risk process.  Testimonies from external agencies 
could also be obtained to establish the methods adopted by those entities and the 
relationship between internal and external evaluation.  The research may be expanded to 
encompass accounts from other evaluators who are not Vice Presidents of Security, 
Chiefs of Police, or Security Managers in charge of all security operations at the venue 
but are still involved in the decision-making process.  Additionally, examination of 
stakeholders and their influence could be further reviewed. 
Another recommendation for further investigation would be to take a deeper look 
into how exactly risk perception and ultimately the risk process changed as a result of 
world events.  From this study, we know there was a shift in how assessments were 




United States and throughout the world.  It would be important to note why this time 
period was the turning point in the assessment process and whether it was a slow or 
rapidly growing evolution that only a few or large majority of venues accepted to follow 
in the beginning.  The researcher could also seek information about other influences that 
may have shaped the reformation of risk assessment and perceptions of individuals. 
 While this study demonstrated evaluators use a variety of resources to complete 
an assessment, the data collected differed from venue to venue due to availability of 
resources.  Although every participant mentioned the usage of other agencies for 
recommendations and intel gathering, the quantity and quality of information at the 
facility were vaguely defined.  It would be interesting to see if the information collected 
from various venues all make the same recommendations or lead to the same conclusions 
and how they affect the assessment and management process.  A study could also be 
conducted to directly test the level of subjectivity by examining the differences between 
multiple assessments of single facilities to understand the impact of different assessors 
and information types. 
 In conclusion, the risk assessment process, though usually thought to be an 
objective process with a small margin of bias, it actually relies on a sizeable amount of 
subjective input from internal and external evaluators.  Due to this, risk assessment and 
mitigation is dependent on the experiences of evaluators and how they identify and 
analyze risks.  As Park, Peacey, and Munafo (2014) reported in their own study, 
implementation of peer review can alter the results of such assessments and lead to 
misperception and acceptance of conclusions within the industry.  The details regarding 




established that opinions and experiences are consistently called upon to make decisions.  
Primarily trusting expert opinions and experiences to make decisions increases the 
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Subjectivity and Objectivity in Regards to Risk Assessments 
Guided Interview: 
 
This document is to serve as an interview guide for which the interviewer will utilize when 
posing questions during the interview process. As such, the document is strictly a guide and 
further questioning in some areas may occur in order to gain information. This will allow the 
participant to shape the conversation within the areas included in the interview based on 
responses received from questions presented in the guide.  
 
 
Qualifications and Training: 
 
1. What training and certifications must someone possess in order to conduct a risk 
assessment at this particular facility? How many hours are dedicated to training? How 
often is training offered? How consistently do individuals attend training? Is training paid 
for via the company putting on the event or self-sponsored? Is training mandatory or 
“encouraged”? 
2. What is your background as it relates to this field? 
3. What, [in your opinion?], qualifies someone to conduct a risk assessment? 
 
Internal and External Context: 
 
1. Describe the physical barrier/perimeter the risk assessment covers. How was the 
perimeter determined? Do the internal and external contexts of the assessment change 
with respect to evaluator or does context remain fairly constant throughout the process 
regardless of the evaluator? 
2. How often is the venue inspected for repairs as a preventative measure against risk 
factors? 
3. When creating emergency operations plans in the event something tragic does occur at 
the venue, what is taken into account (modes of transit, communication between security 











Risk Assessment Tool and Process: 
 
1. How often is a threat assessment conducted at the facility? How many people are 
typically involved in conducting a risk/threat assessment for this particular venue? Are 
threat assessments conducted by individuals who work for the venue or are companies 
privately contracted out to conduct an assessment? 
2. Does the facility utilize any particular risk assessment model? If so, which one and why 
that particular model? What steps are taken in order to complete the assessment using the 
specified assessment model? 





1. What is this organization’s risk criteria? At what level/point/threshold is a risk deemed 
acceptable or tolerable? How was this decided upon? Who/what was involved in 
determining the criteria? What methods are used to identify and prioritize risks in the 
evaluation/treatment steps of the assessment process? What conditions are taken into 
consideration during prioritization (level of risk, budget for countermeasure, etc.)? 
2. According to the current risk assessment, what is considered the number one risk this 
venue faces? Why is it the number one risk as declared by the assessment? How was this 
determined? How has this risk been mitigated to a tolerable level to ensure the safety of 













1. Would you describe your risk assessment process as quantitative, semi-quantitative, 
qualitative, or semi-qualitative? How is the data used in the assessment obtained and 
analyzed? How do you account for uncertainties that arise during your assessment? 
2. When evaluating the likelihood of individual risks occurring, what probability methods or 
data analyses, if any, are involved with that process? 





1. What types of controls/countermeasures are implemented at the venue to modify the level 
of potential risk internally and externally decided upon the assessment? How were those 
controls chosen as the best fit? 
2. Does the same person(s) conducting a risk assessment also have a say in how the 
company/venue mitigates the risks identified? If so, how much weight does the assessor’s 
input have in that decision making process in comparison to other stakeholders? Are 
ways of mitigation chosen based on best practices, most safe, most cost-effective, or a 
combination of any of the listed attributes? 
3. Which agencies regularly work security at the venue? If an attack did occur, who would 
have jurisdiction and why? Is every security officer briefed on the risks identified from 
the assessment and operations plan prior to a major event at the venue/are they familiar 










Perception of Risk by Professional Involved in Risk Process: 
 
1. How have your attitudes towards individual risks (e.g. crowd violence, human 
trafficking, and terrorism) changed throughout the years? Has this translated to the risk 
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